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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DICTATORSHIP IN FLORENCE IN 1342*
MARVIN B. BECKER
University of Arkansas
The Florentine revolution of 1342 offers an excellent illustration of what
modern historians, such as Kenneth Setton and Alfred von Marten, call the proto,
or first Fascism, of the Renaissance. 1 It was as a result of this insurrection
that Walter of Brienne was made Lord of the Republic. 2 The Council of the Peo-
ple bequeathed^ to him dictatorial perogatives. It was at the new dictator's
behest that the' Ordinances of Justice were prorogued. 3 The security and liberty
of the Republic were no longer to be predicated upon the constitutional tradi-
tion of the staOe, but upon the whim of Lord Walter of Brienne. 4
Why was the state subverted? Why were the liberties of the Commune surren-
dered? 5 Why was the authority of the Priors eliminated? 6
To answer these questions we must go back into the thirteenth century; for
it was in that era that Florence began her large-scale commercial relations with
England, France, and the Levant. 7 Into these distant lands the enterprizing
merchants of the Red Lily exported vast amounts of capital. Great financial
risks were taken in the barbarous countries to the north and the luxurious lands
to the east. But these great risks were taken at high interest rates. The fate
of these ventures was predicated upon political and economic contingencies over
which neither the popolo grasso (burghers) nor their government had the remotest
control. The magnitude of these loans reached such a point that the prosperity
of the Republic was tied to the economies of "divergent and distant countries.""
The safety of these loans was put in jeopardy at the turn of the fourteenth cen-
tury. With the decline of the closed economic system of feudalism there was a
breakdown of the traditional safeguards of internationalists culture and law. 9
Foreigners were placed outside of the culture and extra-legally outside of the
law.
"
Villani was disturbed by the hatred of the Londoners for the Florentine
capitalists. 11 This xenophobia was not confined to London, nor to England, but
was a frame of mind prevalent throughout all of Europe. Nor was it directed
solely against the Florentines, but rather it was a characteristic of the re-
vival of nationalism which Sapori believed transformed Europe into an armed camp
in the early fourteenth century. 12 This hatred for the Auslander vent itself on
different groups in the following centuries: the Italians in the fourteenth,
the Papacy in the fifteenth, and the Germans in the sixteenth century. 13 But in
each case it was a reaction against exploitation, guised in the monarchical
cloak of national indignation.
By the decrees of May 6, 1339, Edward IIIof England suspended payment on
his obligation to the Bardi and Peruzzi, two of the most powerful of the Floren-
tine banking houses. 14 According to Villani, whose experience in Italo-Engl ish
banking affairs was great, the suspension involved the loss of 1,365,000 golden'
florins. 15 Estimates vary on the amount of the default. Sapori states that two
thirds of this figure is nearer the truth. 16 In either case the loss in monies
was at least three times the total annual revenue of the Commune of Florence. 17
Schevill contends that the annual revenue of the Republic was more than the King
of Naples could extract from his entire realm in any given year. 18
The English historians, Russell 19 and Rhodes, 20 concur in the opinion that
Edward's treatment of the bankers of the Republic of the Red Lily was shabby.
But from the Englishman's point of view it was a rather inexpensive method of
keeping a militaristic monarch in gold.
The repudiation of the Italian debt by the English was but one of the sev-
eral disasters that overtook the Republic on the Arno during this period. The
armies and the diplomats of the Commune had been thwarted in their diverse impe-
rialistic schemes, conceived to achieve suzerainty over all of Tuscany. This
aspiration was dashed in October of 1341 when the Pisans captured the city of
Lucca. The Florentines at this time, may well have recalled the invective ofDante, "A curse upon Pisa! May the Arno be dammed at its mouth, and drown all
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Pisa, man and mouse, beneath its raging waters." 21 Inpursuit of status in for-
eign affairs and stability at home, the government had contracted a debt of more
than 800,000 golden florins. 22 The Pistoian Chronicle relates that "the popolo
minuto (working class) began to speak harshly of the popolo grasso." 23 Machia-
velli writes that the people condemned the governing classes even in their con-
versations in the streets and the market places. 24
The ruling oligarchy had not only lost a major war, but they had made un-
wise expenditures, and failing to provide for the immediate needs of the subject
population, consequently lost their support. This loss of confidence stemmed
from their ineffectual handling of state affairs. Paoli contends that these
conditions were a result of inexperience rather than of the malicious intent of
the oligarchy. 2 -> The government was in such dire straits that ithad to advise
its allies, the Papacy and the Kingdom of Naples, of its inability to advance
them certain monies for mutual defense. 26 Nor could it aid the bankers in se-
curing the requisite wool necessary to keep the weavers employed. 27 An increase
in the rate of taxation might have salvaged the state, but the English default
on its Florentine loans, coupled with the first battles of the Hundred Years
war, had curtailed trade with the North. It was on just that trade that the
prosperity of the Republic depended.
Florence faced a seemingly hopeless economic situation. There was no solu-
tion within the traditional republican nexus. Bankruptcy forced the Commune to
suspend payment on the state debt. The business men recognized that their ruin
was imminent on two levels. In order to make restitution, their fortunes would
have to be placed at the disposal of their hungry creditors. In addition, the
halcyon days of their political power would end with their loss of prestige.
To prevent this and to preserve the last vestiges of their influence, they had
selected a dictator.
To retain control of the financial policies of the Commune, the magnates
agreed to sacrifice sovereignty in foreign affairs to Walter of Brienne. 28 To
this end, full power was given to the Count of Brienne in September, 1342. The
limit of one year that had been placed on his Signoria in July was removed; he
was proclaimed Lord of the City of the Red Lily for life. He was supported by
all of the orders. The popolo minuto favored Walter over the oligarchy since
the latter had failed to bring the Pisan War to a successful conclusion. The
grandi (nobles) supported him because they hoped he would recall their exiled
relatives from banishment. 30 Machiavelli epitomizes the situation by saying
that since the popolo grasso could not meet their financial commitments they
were willing to free themselves by enslaving their country. 31
The citizens themselves were responsible for Walter's elevation to power.
Ithad been achieved not through force of arms, but through popular acclimation,
midst wild rejoicings. Alarms were sounded; church bells rang out the "Te
Deum"; the mob shouted, "Be our Lord, " and "Hail the Duke our Lord. " Then il
popolo hoisted il signore on their shoulders and carried him through the Piazza.
Down from the tower came the flag of the Republic and up went the ensign of
Brienne. 32
Economic conditions were conducive to such demonstrations of enthusiasm.
All classes desired a dictator; the popolo grasso hoping for a moratorium on
debts; 33 the grandi, a return to power; 34 and the popolo minuto, an end to un-
employment. 35 To this end there was a unanimity of opinion unusual in the an-
nals of the history of the city. The classical tripartizioni of society ceased
to exist for the time being. The nobles, the business men, and the lower orders
had acted in harmony and with great dispatch and thus were able to effect a
bloodless revolution. 36
The dominance of one class in the state was, for diverse political, social,
and economic reasons, reprehensible to the other orders. Two centuries of
Guelph versus Ghibelline, with its honorific blood-letting, had evaporated as a
vain myth by the fourteenth century. 37 Two centuries of contention and vendetta
between the families, revenge and counter- revenge the theme, had brought nothing
but suspicion and death in its wake. 38 Two centuries of civil war between the
nobles and the haute bourgeoisie had brought Florence alternate waves of pros-
perity and financial crises. Centuries of the hatred of the malnate (base born)
for those groomed to the purple had disrupted the judicial process. 39 Recent
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j1 illusionment with imperial policy had dashed the high hopes of the Dantes of
h age. The grief of Anagni and the shame of Avignon discouraged intellectuals
f Petrarch' s ilk.40 Itwas in the climate of these failures that Florentine
blic opinion was formed. It was in the atmosphere of these disasters that adecision was reached to establish a signoria. Sapori contends that as sanguine
xpectation for a solution for these problems faded, so in direct proportion did
the traditional morality of the classes. 4
*
He suggests that the destruction of
the feudal economy, law, and culture by the artisans, speculators, and workers
made the rejection of the old morality inevitable. The priors were expelled
from their palace and the Ordinances of Justice were destroyed by a hysterical,
emotional popolo. The magnates painted Walter's coat-of-arms on the facades of
their houses over the traditional emblems of the Republic. 42
That the officers, laws, and symbols of government should have been sacri-
ficed with such indecent enthusiasm is indicative of a change in political mo-
rality; a change which Villani, an eyewitness, ascribed to divine retribution
for the sins of his fellow citizens; 43 a change which, even in the time of
Dante, was discernible, and in the life of Petrarch was obvious even to the hu-
manist shut off from the world by folios of Cicero. 44 This gradual disenchant-
ment with the existing order was accompanied by a rising sentiment in favor of a
>olitical solution to the pressing economic and social problems. Itis at best
a sentiment. There is little evidence to indicate that any of the orders of
citizens contemplated or desired a profound reintegration of the social or eco-
nomic system. It was a rearrangement at the executive level that was envis-
oned. This is a characteristic of Italian thought during the Renaissance,
•etrarch, Dante, and even Machiavelli posited solutions which were romantic,
superficial, and impractical in terms of the complex needs of Italian society. 45
"All can be arighted if we can but find the 'Just Emperor, the 'Good Pope,' or
the 'Ideal Prince
'"
This "Great Man" will in some magic inexplicable way solve
the banking problem, the Pisan problem, the employment problem, and the English
>roblem. In the mind of the Italians this was to be secured through the reali-
zation of the Ciceronian ideal of establishing concord between the various so-
cial orders. This was a great myth in the last days of the Roman Republic and
as such was a source of inspiration to Cicero and his friends. It followed that
n the fourteenth century this ideal was viewed by the Italian romantics as a
solution to their problems. The myth was not discredited until the sack of Rome
m 1527. 46
The establishment of a dictatorship failed to solve the fundamental prob-
ems of the Florentine state. Dictators before, and dictators after Walter's
>rief tenure, were impotent in the face of the complexities of the Italian capi-
talism. Walter's policy was typical of the Renaissance despot: favor the mid-
dle class, kill off any dissenters. Make peace or war in the interests of
domestic security, and grant the popolo minuto and the grandi bread and circuses
respectively. An examination of all the documents of the Archivio di Stato di
?irenze connected with Walter's despotate, from May 14, 1342 47 to August 6-,
¦ 343, 48 shows this to be his policy.
The virtu of the nuovi principi would in some mystical way prove beneficial
-o all the social classes. Economic and social stability would be obtained, not
•y changing fundamental relationships, but by establishing that which Alfred
von Martin designated as the welfare state of the haute bour geoi si e.49 This
solution postulates a return to a static hierarchical society, in which all or-
lers are fixed to that social and economic position at which maximum concord be-¦ween the classes is achieved. Just where this mythical point was located thedespot of the early Renaissance could not say. Itremained for the Medici to
approximate its location at a later date.
The revolution of 1342 was a rearrangement rather than a reorganization of¦he state. It substituted the authority of one man for the authority of the
rti maggiori (greater guilds). Ottokar states that the Priorate was' the exclu-
ive property of the popolani grassi (wealthy merchants) as early as 1282. 50
'e despot was brought in at their behest and he was expected to act in terms of
•heir interests. 51 That Walter failed to do this is indicated by his subsequent
verthrow by la classe plutocratica. According to Schevill, his ouster resulted
rom his inability to master the ever deepening financial crisis. 52 Itmight be
e*l to extend this thesis. It was his attempt to solve this problem that
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frightened the middle class. They were desirous of a solution, but not on his
terms. Walter's concessions to the popolo minuto, (whom he fondly called le bonpopule), of which there are at least six recorded in the Archivio di Stato diFirenze, were attempts to alleviate the situation. 54 Overthrowing the prevail-
ing wage policy, taking the part of the employees against the arti maggiori, was
more than a just rearrangement of the apex of authority. Itwas a threat to the
security of the church, nobility, and burghers. 55 The dictator was despot
within the limits of the security of those orders. Once he violated the limitshe was faced with revolution. This was the frame of reference in which the
Medici later ruled. This traditional attitude remained constant until the sack
of Rome. Guicciardini was the first historian with any real insight into the
situation. 5fi
Michelet characterizes the spirit of the protoFascism of this age in the
words:
Never was there an age less favorable to... high tendencies. .. [it
was symbolized by] the living materialism of the tyrants and the band
of mercenaries, the bourgeois platitude of the man of finance and
money. A religion began in the banks of Florence having in gold its
real presence and in letters of exchange its eucharist. 57
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